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INTRODUCTION
The federal statute of limitations permits the United States to
prosecute acts of fraud against the government for only five years after
the fraud occurs.' As a result, when you went to Cancun during your
senior year of college and, in a fit of youthful indiscretion, burned
through $5,000 of your federal student loans, criminal liability hung
over your head for a relatively short period of time.2 During times of
war, however, acts of fraud against the United States-from misuse of
student loans to welfare fraud, embezzlement, or bribery3-are not
subject to this strict limitation. War tolls the statute of limitations, and
at the war's end, the Government enjoys an extra five years on the
statute-of-limitations clock.4 In this way, if a war erupted shortly after
your youthful indiscretion, the statute of limitations for misusing your
student loan ran longer than if, say, you had bombed federal
property.5
I See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006) (describing fraud against the government); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3282(a) (2006) (providing a five-year limitation unless otherwise excepted by statute). A
few enumerated acts of fraud, however, are subject to longer limitations periods. See gener-
ally CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31253, STATUTES OF LIMITATION IN FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASES: AN OVERVIEW 19-24 (2007) (listing the limitations periods for enumer-
ated federal crimes).
2 See 20 U.S.C. § 1097(a) (2006) ("Any person who knowingly and will-
fully . . . misapplies . . . any funds, assets, or property provided or insured under this
[Student Assistance] subchapter . . . shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned
for not more than 5 years, or both .... ").
3 Based on an FBI study of white-collar crime in the three years between 1997 and
1999, the government identified roughly 7,000 instances of criminal activity that could be
subject to this tolling mechanism. CYNTHIA BARNETr, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, FED. BUREAtU
OF INVESTIGATION, THE MEASUREMENT OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME USING UNIFORM CRIME RE-
PORTING (UCR) DATA 5 tbl.6 (2000), available at http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/whitecollarfor
web.pdf (reporting the number of offenses against government victims that involved fraud,
bribery, counterfeiting, and embezzlement).
4 See 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (Supp. IV 2010). Charles C. Callahan once quipped that
"there is a conflict ofjudicial opinion on almost every question connected with the statute
of limitations; and that they 'always have vexed the philosophical mind.'" Charles Calla-
han, Statutes of Limitation-Background, 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 130, 132 (1955) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 313 (1945)). Because of the confus-
ing nature of statutes of limitations, it may help to clarify a few points relating to limitations
jargon. "Tolling," in common legal usage and in this Note, means to pause the limitations
clock. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1625 (9th ed. 2009) (defining the verb "toll" as "([o] f a
time period, esp. a statutory one) to stop the running of; to abate ... ."). Thus, a five-year
limitation that is tolled for two years will not expire for a total of seven years. The termi-
nology surrounding the expiration of a limitations period may also raise confusion. In this
Note, variations of the terms "expire" and "close" will be used to refer to the end of a
limitations period. Some writers use "to run" to mean "to expire"; others use it when they
mean "to continue." See discussion infra Part II.B.2. Except as required by quotation, this
Note will use "to run" to refer only to the continued ticking of the limitations clock.
5 The limitation on your crime would run for the normal five years, plus the duration
of the war, plus an extra five years after the war. See 18 U.S.C. § 3287. For bombing federal
property, you face a ten-year limitations period. See 18 U.S.C. § 3295 (2006).
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This tolling mechanism for fraud against the government traces
its roots to the aftermath of World War I, when the Department of
Justice pleaded with Congress for extra time to prosecute certain
crimes. A generation later, as the United States carried out another
massive war effort, Congress passed the Wartime Suspension of Limi-
tations Act (WSLA) to toll the statute of limitations until 1945. In
1948, Congress enacted legislation that made permanent the princi-
ple behind the WSLA: war tolls the limitations clock for fraud against
the government and, after a time of war, the government enjoys an
additional cushion before the statute of limitations begins to run
again. 6
Congress enacted the WSLA in the midst of wartime haste and
left many unanswered questions. In the decade following World War
II, federal courts grappled with the interpretation of the statute; in
1953 alone, the U.S. Supreme Court decided three cases that turned
upon its meaning. 7 After the wartime cases completed their course,
however, prosecutors largely ignored the statute.
Undeclared wars in Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan in the 1990s
and 2000s inspired new interest in the statute and prompted new
questions as prosecutors sought to resurrect it. Were these conflicts
"wars" for the purposes of the WSLA? In the wake of judicial uncer-
tainty, Congress passed the Wartime Enforcement of Fraud Act (the
Amendment) in 2008, incorporating authorized military actions-
short of declared war-into the WSLA's list of applicable triggers. 8
What Congress neglected to clarify was when and how the WSLA
could be deactivated-that is, once a sufficient war triggers the provi-
sion, when will that war end?9
Prosecutors used the WSLA for nearly a decade after WWII en-
ded; if the past is any guide, when the conflict in Afghanistan ends,
courts can expect prosecutors to bring cases under the WSLA for
many years, potentially decades after the crimes were committed. The
problem, though, is not that a limitations period might last for many
years. The problem is that the WSLA and its Amendment leave un-
resolved interpretive questions, the answers to which bear material
consequences. For example, if you frittered away your federal student
loans in 1997, a broad interpretation of the WSLA would stretch the
6 See discussion infra Part I.B.
7 See United States v. Grainger, 346 U.S. 235 (1953); Bridges v. United States, 346
U.S. 209 (1953); United States v. Klinger, 345 U.S. 979 (1953) (per curiam).
8 S. 2892, 110th Cong. § 2 (2008).
9 18 U.S.C. § 3287 suspends the limitations period until "5 years after the termina-
tion of hostilities as proclaimed by a Presidential proclamation, with notice to Congress, or
by a concurrent resolution of Congress." This standard has defied easy application to Pres-
ident Obama's statements regarding the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. See discussion
infra Parts I1.C.1 and V.C.
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normal five-year limitation on your crime into a limitation more than
twenty years long that would last until at least 2019. In contrast, a
narrow interpretation would have buried that crime in 2002. Courts
are currently at odds over the best reading of the statute. This insta-
bility in the law undermines the certainty that the statute of limita-
tions exists to provide.
This Note seeks to isolate the questions that the WSLA and the
2008 Amendment leave open and to propose answers to those ques-
tions. By way of background, Part I examines the statute of limitations
in the criminal context. In particular, it will survey the history of crim-
inal limitations in the United States and the purposes for which limita-
tions exist. Part II explores the structure and operation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3287, which codifies the WSLA. This part focuses on the legislative
changes and judicial interpretations that have shaped the current pro-
vision. Part III refines and explores two critical questions about
§ 3287: when is it triggered and what circumstances will end the trig-
gering war? Part IV suggests a method for answering these questions.
I
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: ITS PURPOSES AND ORIGINS
A. Purposes of Criminal Statutes of Limitations
Judges, practitioners, and theorists ascribe varying purposes to
statutes of limitations. Perhaps most prevalent among these justifica-
tions is that limitations promote certainty and stability by preventing
stale claims.' 0 In a seminal exposition of limitations law, the Supreme
Court in Toussie v. United States reasoned that criminal law limits expo-
sure to prosecution in order to "protect individuals from having to
defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have be-
come obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of
official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past."'11 The pas-
sage of time erodes the mass of available evidence, making defense
more difficult and prosecution less reliable.
Statutes of limitations serve many additional purposes that often
overlap. 12 Indeed, the Supreme Court added in Toussie that the stat-
10 See Callahan, supra note 4, at 133 (arguing that preventing stale claims is a rationale
cited "so frequently in opinions that lit] must be taken to state at least a verbal consensus
as to the policy of the statutes"); see also Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63
HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950) [hereinafter Developments] (stating that fairness to the
accused is the primary reason for the statute of limitations); Note, The Statute of Limitations
in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to Prosecution, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 632 (1954) [here-
inafter Penetrable Barrier] (claiming the most important reason for a limitation period is
protecting the accused from defending against "long-completed misconduct" because wit-
nesses, evidence, and memories are lost or forgotten over time).
11 397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970).
12 See Callahan, supra note 4; Developments, supra note 10, at 1185-86.
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ute of limitations may "have the salutary effect of encouraging law en-
forcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal
activity." 13 Other apparent purposes include repose for courts, soci-
ety, and defendants.1 4 Limitations serve as "practical and pragmatic
devices to spare the courts" from caseloads bogged down by tenuous
and unimportant claims.15 For society, efficient markets rely on the
security and stability of transactions, and a limitations period ensures
that one's bargaining counterpart will not be hauled before the court
for long-ago crimes that business judgment could not have reasonably
discovered. 16 As a corollary, society derives less utility from prosecut-
ing crimes buried in the past. 17 For defendants, limitations provide
repose as a form of grace for people whose unrepeated crimes rest
deep in the past; they protect those who have rehabilitated themselves
and pose little threat to society.18 All of these objectives bespeak some
time limit on culpability.
Nevertheless, the way that society applies statutes of limitations
largely contradicts the rationales that support them. If "freshness,"
repose, or prosecutorial motivation drove statutes of limitations, then
these statutes would not assign longer limitations periods for more
serious crimes. But, of course, they do. In a case of aggravated mur-
der, for which no limitation applies, 19 none of the proffered ratio-
nales would counsel a longer limitations period; in particular, the
desire for fresh evidence would seem to be even stronger for serious
crimes. If the most serious crimes face no limitations period, some
"counterpurpose" must overcome the standard rationales for statutes
of limitations.20 Likely, society's desire to vindicate justice-a desire
for retribution without regard to time-arises in the treatment of seri-
ous crimes, especially capital crimes. 2' In sum, multiple purposes and
13 397 U.S. at 115; see Penetrable Barrier, supra note 10, at 633.
14 See Callahan, supra note 4, at 135-36.
15 Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945); see Developments, supra
note 10. Judge Learned Hand disagreed in United States v. Curtiss Aeroplane Co., 147 F.2d
639, 642 (2d Cir. 1945): "Courts are maintained to settle disputes, however the parties may
embroil themselves; it would be a strange doctrine which forbad people to deal with their
affairs as they wish, lest the judges should be unduly vexed."
16 See Callahan, supra note 4, at 136; see also Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 981 P.2d 79, 87
(Cal. 1999) (stating that statutes of limitation, in accordance with public policy, provide
security and stability).
17 See Developments, supra note 10, at 1186, 1235.
18 See id. at 1185 ("The primary consideration underlying such legislation is undoubt-
edly one of fairness to the defendant."); Penetrable Barrier, supra note 10, at 630, 634.
19 See DOYLE, supra note 1, at 19-20 (listing nearly 100 federal capital offenses for
which no limitation applies).
20 See Callahan, supra note 4, at 138.
21 See id.; Penetrable Barrier, supra note 10, at 636 ("[O]ne is left with the conclusion
that the chief motivation for such an approach is the desire for retribution; the more
serious the crime, the more likely is it that this desire will outweigh the aims of limitation
statutes.").
2012] 1561
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
"counterpurposes" collide in a complex body of law that generally
prescribes a hard time limit on criminal indictments, except in cases
of grave crimes.
B. History of Criminal Statutes of Limitations
Statutes of limitations arose in Roman law to bar litigation in civil
actions after a certain point in time. 22 The concept of limiting a
wrongdoer's period of liability entered common law systems in thir-
teenth-century England. 23 These early statutes fixed a point in time-
for example, the coronation of a king-as the date before which the
alleged wrong could not have occurred. As years went by, these fixed
points faded too far into the past, so the law adopted set periods of
time in which plaintiffs had to commence a given type of action. 24
Although England did not translate its civil limitations into the
criminal context,25 continental European countries established lim-
ited periods during which the government could prosecute crimes. 26
This practice also prevailed in North America, where colonial govern-
ments established statutes of limitations as early as 1652.27 Criminal
statutes of limitations likewise were among the first laws passed by
early state legislatures. 28
At the federal level, when the First Congress of the United States
convened in Manhattan, it enacted a set of limitations for federal
criminal actions. 29  Congress's first draft of federal limitations
emerged as a dozen lines tacked onto the end of a general criminal
22 See RUDOLPH SOHM, THE INSTITUTES: A TEXTBOOK OF THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF
ROMAN PRrVATE LAW § 64, at 318-22 (James Crawford Ledlie trans., 3d ed. 1907).
23 Developments, supra note 10, at 1177.
24 Id. at 1177-78. Notably, the Limitation Act of 1623, which provides the basic
framework for modern limitations statutes, sought to clear inconsequential claims from the
dockets of the King's courts by establishing different limitations periods depending on the
nature of the action at bar. See An Act for Limitation of Actions, and for Avoiding of Suits
in Law, 1623, 21Jac. 1, c. 16, §§ 3-7 (Eng.); Developments, supra note 10, at 1177-78.
25 See Developments, supra note 10, at 1179; Penetrable Barrier, supra note 10, at 630 (not-
ing that English doctrine generally holds nullum tempus occunrit regi: that no lapse of time
prohibits the sovereign from prosecuting a crime).
26 See, e.g., Penetrable Barrier supra note 10, at 631 n.6 (citing CODE D'INSTRUCTION
CRIMINELLE arts. 637-38 (Fr.) (prescribing three- and ten-year limitations)). Roman law,
with its twenty-year limitations period, provided a foundation for statutes of limitations in
civil law countries in Europe. These countries now follow a gradated system similar to that
used in the United States. Id. at 631.
27 See, e.g., THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 163 (William H. Whitmore ed.
1889) (establishing in 1652 a one-year period in which to bring indictments or complaints
after the commission of a misdemeanor).
28 See Callahan, supra note 4, at 130-31 ("Occasional intimations that [limitations] are
contrary to the spirit of the law and not to be favored are refuted by the persistence of
these statutes through more than three hundred years of Anglo-American law. .. " (foot-
note omitted)).
29 An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, § 32,
1 Stat. 112, 119 (1790).
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statute passed in 1790. The statute required an indictment within
three years of any alleged treason or capital offense other than "wilful
murder or forgery."30 For all other offenses, an indictment had to
issue within two years. 31 The only statutory tolling mechanism applied
against "any person or persons fleeing from justice."32 This repre-
sented the sole means by which a prosecutor might pause the statute
of limitations.
In 1876, Congress expanded the general statute of limitations for
criminal offenses from two years to three33 and, in 1954, adopted the
current five-year limitations period, which applies to all federal crimes
for which Congress has not established a specific limitations period. 4
Federal law applies specific limitations periods of one, six, seven,
eight, ten, or twenty years to more than a hundred different crimes. 35
Additionally, a number of particularly grave crimes enumerated in a
list are not subject to a limitations period.36
As limitations periods grew, so too did the number of mecha-
nisms for tolling them. In addition to the 1790 tolling provision for
fugitive criminals, Congress has added six more mechanisms by which
a prosecutor may pause the statute of limitations. 37 I turn now to ex-
amine one of these tolling laws.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 An Act to Amend Section 1044 of the Revised Statutes Relating to Limitations in
Criminal Cases, ch. 56, § 1, 19 Stat. 32, 32-33 (1876).
34 An Act to Prohibit Payment of Annuities to Officers and Employees of the United
States Convicted of Certain Offenses, and for Other Purposes, ch. 1214, § 10(a), 68 Stat.
1142, 1145 (1954) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1952)). David E. Seidelson argues in The
Federal Non-Capital Statute of Limitations and Public Law 769-Stare Decisis by Accretion, 30 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 42, 45-47 (1961), that most members of Congress intended to apply this
extension of the general statute of limitations only to corrupt public officials, particularly
purported spies like Alger Hiss, but the proposal ultimately had much broader impact.
When the U.S. District Court for the District of NewJersey faced the statute as a matter of
first impression, it held that legislative intent was not pertinent and that a literal reading of
the statute demands that all criminal actions receive a five-year limitation unless Congress
specifies otherwise. See id. at 49-51. When the jury acquitted the defendant, the case did
not go up on appeal. As a result, other cases cited that ruling, and again, no appeal chal-
lenged the courts' broad interpretation of the statute. The author concludes that district
court judges built a broad enough base of interpretation that other courts just followed
suit and ignored potential legislative intent: stare decisis by accretion. See id. at 52-54.
35 See DOYLE, supra note 1, at 22-24.
36 See id. at 19-22.
37 See 18 U.S.C. § 3283 (2006) (child abuse); 18 U.S.C. § 3284 (2006) (concealment of
assets in bankruptcy); 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (Supp. IV 2010) (wartime fraud against the govern-
ment); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3288-3289 (2006) (dismissal of original charges); 18 U.S.C. § 3292
(2006) (foreign evidence); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3282(b), 3297 (2006) (DNA evidence).
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II
18 U.S.C. § 3287
A. Development of the Provision
The WSLA, codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3287, pauses the statute of
limitations for acts of fraud against the government during times of
war. Like the statute of limitations itself, wartime tolling mechanisms
have a long history in U.S. law.
In the early nineteenth century, a federal judge in North Caro-
lina noted that, as a matter of international law, the civil courts of the
United States are closed to citizens of a foreign country when the
United States is at war with that country.38 Because citizens of an en-
emy power could not bring suit in a U.S. court, equity demanded
some tolling provision to protect individual rights. Before statutory
mechanisms developed to toll the statute of limitations, common law
principles of equity sidestepped the statute's strict deadline.
In the wake of World War I, applying a similar rationale, Con-
gress tolled the limitations clock for crimes of fraud against the
United States. During the war, a surging tide of opportunities to de-
fraud the United States arose from the "gigantic and hastily organized
procurement program," and three years after the war ended, the
surge threatened to outrun the statute of limitations.39 The Depart-
ment of Justice reported that it needed additional time to conduct
"the most minute investigation," which would take considerably
longer than the three-year limitation provided by the general criminal
statute. 40 Congress passed H.R. 8298 in November 1921, providing
prosecutors an additional three years to build their cases.41 Six years
later, the Department of Justice indicated that its time of need had
passed, causing Congress to repeal the statute. 42
In 1942, the United States found itself in the midst of yet another
massive, hastily assembled war effort, and Congress desired to resur-
rect the repealed tolling mechanism. 43 It did so with the Wartime
Suspension of Limitations Act. Initially, the WSLA applied only until
38 In re Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 456, 456-57 (C.C.N.C. 1805) ("The act of 1715, whilst it was
unrepealed, was suspended from its usual operation by the acts disqualifying British adher-
ents to sue in our courts. It did not begin to operate as to such persons till the end of the
war .... The demurrer to the plea, stating these facts, and relying upon the act of 1715,
must be allowed.").
39 Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 218 (1953).
40 Id. at 218 n.17.
41 An Act to Amend Section 1044 of the Revised Statutes of the United States Relating
to Limitations in Criminal Cases, ch. 124, § 1, 42 Stat. 220, 220 (1921).
42 See An Act Amending Section 1044 of the Revised Statutes of the United States as
Amended by the Act Approved November 17, 1921, ch. 6, 45 Star. 51, 51 (1927); see also
Bridges, 346 U.S. at 218 n.1 7 (describing the Department of Justice's request for an ex-
tended limitation and the subsequent termination of that extension).
43 See S. REP. No. 77-1544, at 2 (1942).
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June 30, 1945. 4 4 Realizing that the war would not end by the WSLA's
cutoff, Congress extended the statute in July 1944 so that it would
operate until the end of the war.45 This amendment also introduced
a new feature: it would continue to toll the statute of limitations until
three years after the conclusion of the war.46 As the WSLA neared its
sunset, Congress opted to enact a permanent code provision imple-
menting this tolling principle for all future wars.47
In 2008, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy re-
vamped the WSLA, after decades of disuse, with the Wartime Enforce-
ment of Fraud Act.48 With the Amendment, Senator Leahy wished to
ensure that the WSLA could apply in a contemporary national security
context.49 To achieve this goal, he structured three specific elements
into the Amendment. First, the Amendment explicitly applied the
WSLA to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan-or any conflict for
44 See An Act to Suspend Temporarily the Running of Statutes of Limitations Applica-
ble to Certain Offenses, ch. 555, § 1, 56 Stat. 747, 747-48 (1942).
45 See Surplus Property Act of 1944, ch. 479, § 28, 58 Stat. 765, 781 (1944) (codified at
50A U.S.C. §§ 1611-1646 (1946)).
46 See id.
47 See An Act to Revise, Codify, and Enact Into Positive Law, Title 18 of the United
States Code, Entitled "Crimes and Criminal Procedure," ch. 645, § 3287, 62 Stat. 683, 828
(1948) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2006)) ("When the United States is at
war the running of any statute of limitations applicable to any offense (1) involving fraud
or attempted fraud against the United States or any agency thereof in any manner,
whether by conspiracy or not ... shall be suspended until three years after the termination
of hostilities as proclaimed by the President or by a concurrent resolution of Congress.
Definitions of terms in Section 103 of Title 41 shall apply to similar terms used in this
section.").
48 See S. 2892, 110th Cong. (2008). After the Amendment, the WSLA reads:
When the United States is at war or Congress has enacted a specific
authorization for the use of the Armed Forces, as described in section 5(b)
of the War Powers Resolution, the running of any statute of limitations ap-
plicable to any offense (1) involving fraud or attempted fraud against the
United States or any agency thereof in any manner, whether by conspiracy
or not ... shall be suspended until 5 years after the termination of hostili-
ties as proclaimed by a Presidential proclamation, with notice to Congress,
or by a concurrent resolution of Congress.
Definitions of terms in section 103 of Title 41 shall apply to similar
terms used in this section. For purposes of applying such definitions in this
section, the term 'war' includes a specific authorization for the use of the
Armed Forces, as described in section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.
18 U.S.C. § 3287 (Supp. 1V 2010) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
49 See 154 CONG. REc. S3174-75 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2008) ("Today we introduce the
Wartime Enforcement of Fraud Act of 2008, which updates President Roosevelt's law for
our times. This will allow us better to protect American taxpayers from contracting fraud
today,just as we did during World War II."). In so doing, Senator Leahy implied an answer
to an ongoing question. His legislation suggests that the WSLA did not apply to the con-
flicts in Iraq and Afghanistan prior to 2008. This implication notwithstanding, the intent
of Congress when it standardized the WSLA in 1948 cannot be divined on the basis of post
hoc legislation passed by Congress in 2008. The question of the WSLA's application to the
undeclared wars prior to 2008 therefore remains unresolved. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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which Congress authorized the use of force. 50 Second, the bill ex-
tended from three to five years the period after war during which the
statute of limitations remains paused. 51 Finally, the legislation re-
quired that, to end hostilities, the President may not simply proclaim
an end. Rather, the Amendment specifically requires that the termi-
nation of hostilities "be proclaimed by a Presidential proclamation,"-
an awkwardly redundant turn of phrase-and accompanied by notice
to Congress. 52
Why, after lying dormant throughout the Korean and Vietnam
Wars, did the WSLA spring up again in 2008? Given the narrower
scope of the current military conflicts53 and the prodigious capacity of
federal prosecutors, why did Senator Leahy feel compelled to expand
a sovereign exemption developed to cope with the exigencies of
global war?5 4
The 2008 Amendment's seemingly redundant third element sug-
gests an underlying motive for its enactment. Senator Leahy argued
that the original language of the WSLA permitted a president to infor-
mally proclaim that hostilities had ended. By requiring that the war's
end be "proclaimed by a Presidential proclamation, with notice to
Congress,"' 55 Senator Leahy argued that a president would be com-
pelled to go beyond a "[s] ecret proclamation ... or a self-serving 'mis-
sion accomplished' speech." 56  By inserting the proclamation
requirements, Senator Leahy emphasized that, all presidential public-
ity stunts to the contrary, the United States was still very much at war
in 2008. In this way, Senator Leahy indicated that he wanted to give
the Bush Administration a black eye, regardless of the substantive im-
pact the Amendment might carry.
50 See S. 2892 § 2(2).
51 See id. § 2(3).
52 See id. § 2(4).
53 An important question for policymakers is whether a wartime tolling mechanism
can apply at all in a context that some commentators have described as "perpetual war" or
"eternal war." See GORE VIDAL, PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE: How WE GOT TO BE
So HATED 20 (2002); Robert Fisk, Locked in an Orwellian Eternal War, INDEP. (London), Feb.
18, 2001, at 1. Whether prudent or not, though, Congress has clearly decided that this
tolling provision currently applies to the military conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
54 Cf Developments, supra note 10, at 1252-53 ("In modern times there seems to be
little justification for the sovereign exemption. . . . [T]he argument that the rigors of
statutes of limitations should not be applied to overworked government officials is difficult
to square with the universal limitations on the government's taxing and penal functions,
areas in which the burden of public law enforcement is particularly heavy." (footnote
omitted)).
55 Wartime Enforcement of Fraud Act of 2008, S. 2892, 110th Cong. § 2(4) (2008).
56 154 CONG. REC. S3175 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2008). Magnifying Senator Leahy's point,
the Court in United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 455 (D. Mass. 2008), held that
President Bush's "Mission Accomplished" moment aboard the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln con-
stituted the termination of hostilities in Iraq so far as the WSLA was concerned.
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Similar subtext came through in Senator Leahy's other speeches
about the Amendment. He chastened the Administration for its "fail-
ure to take aggressive action to enforce and punish wartime fraud"
and for implementing "'no-bid' and 'cost-plus' contracts ... awarded
with little, if any, oversight or accountability."5 7 On the day the bill
passed Congress, Senator Leahy let loose:
The failed legacy of the Bush [A] dministration is clearer today than
ever before, as our Nation faces unprecedented crises .. .[includ-
ing being] mired in Iraq, fighting a war that President Bush should
never ha[ve] started, that continues to cost too many lives and bil-
lions of dollars each month, with no end in sight. As part of this
legacy, the Bush [A]dministration has further failed to meet one of
its most important obligations during wartime-to protect Ameri-
can taxpayers from losses due to fraud and corruption in war
contracting.58
Whereas legislators originally enacted the WSLA to accommodate the
"necessities" of all-out war,59 whatever policy objectives the 2008
Amendment nominally addressed, the bill seems to have been
drafted, in large part, as a political exclamation point. As such, the
bill missed the mark. It failed to answer critical operational questions,
which will soon require judicial attention.
B. Resolving Initial Confusion About the Operation of § 3287
In the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, courts addressed sev-
eral questions that the WSLA's bare statutory language left un-
resolved. Among the most pressing disputes, disagreement sprang up
over the scope of "fraud against the government" and the meaning of
"running."
1. Defining "Involving Fraud Against the United States"
The WSLA's exclusive application to crimes of fraud against the
government remains somewhat puzzling. When Congress expanded
the statute of limitations for fraud after World War I, it acted in re-
sponse to a specific request from the Department ofJustice. 60 By con-
trast, Congress passed the WSLA in the midst of the war because the
"law-enforcement branch of the Government [was] also busily en-
gaged in its many duties, including the enforcement of the espionage,
57 Id. at S3174.
58 154 CONG. REc. S9964 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008). The Senate passed the 2008
Amendment on September 27, 2008, as part of a larger omnibus bill: the Consolidated
Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, H.R. 2638, 11 0th
Cong. (2008). President Bush signed the Amendment into law on September 30, 2008.
59 See Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 219 n.18 (1953); Willard P. Norberg, The
Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act, 3 STAN. L. REv. 440, 452 (1951).
60 See Bridges, 346 U.S. at 218-19.
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sabotage, and other laws" 61 and because the massive military mobiliza-
tion had thinned the government's investigative personnel. 62 These
rationales would not seem to advocate a narrow extension of the stat-
ute of limitations; rather, they appear to urge a general suspension of
limitations on all crimes. 63 Some lower courts agreed and gave the
statute a broad gloss, 64 but in confining the WSLA to crimes of fraud
against the government, Congress clearly intended to impose some
limit. What were the contours of that limit?
In a foundational article on the WSLA, attorney Willard Norberg
wrestled with defining what offenses "involve fraud."65 He dismissed
any attempt to take a plain-meaning approach to the multifaceted
concept of fraud and instead proposed four possible definitions from
which courts could choose: (1) offenses involving pecuniary loss to
the United States, such as tax fraud; (2) offenses with statutory defini-
tions that include the word "fraud" but that cause no pecuniary loss,
such as fraudulent petitions for naturalization; (3) offenses that in-
clude some form of the word "fraud" with the connotation of "false"
or "fictitious," such as false statements; and (4) offenses defined with-
out any reference to the word "fraud" and from which no pecuniary
loss results, such as perjury. 66 Norberg reasoned that the justifications
for the WSLA supported a general suspension of the statute of limita-
tions but that, unfortunately, Congress had not reached that far in its
enactment. In the absence of clear legislative intent, Norberg called
upon the courts to use his four alternatives to define "some other logi-
cal and workable test that can be understood and applied."67
Two years after Norberg's article, the Supreme Court answered
his call in Bridges v. United States. Writing for a four-to-three majority,
Justice Harold Burton determined that the WSLA applied only to
fraud "of a pecuniary nature or at least of a nature concerning prop-
erty. '68 He went on to emphasize that Congress limited the suspen-
sion statute to "offenses in which defrauding or attempting to defraud
the United States is an essential ingredient of the offense charged."69 Tak-
61 Id. at 219 n.18.
62 See Norberg, supra note 59.
63 See id.
64 See United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360, 368 (2d Cir. 1948) (determining that
Congress's purpose for enacting the WSLA "was not to let crimes pass unpunished which
had been committed in the hurly-burly of war"); United States v. Choy Kum, 91 F. Supp.
769, 771 (N.D. Cal. 1950) (concluding that Congress intended a broad application of fraud
against the government, including "criminal acts of a domestic nature which were injurious
to it as a sovereign").
65 See Norberg, supra note 59 passim.
66 Id. at 442-43.
67 Id. at 452.
68 Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 215 (1953).
69 Id. at 221.
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ing these standards together, false statements do not trigger the
WSLA, 70 nor does the mere existence of the word "fraud" in a crime's
description.71 In short, crimes that involve fraud relating to money or
property-such as welfare fraud, bribery, counterfeiting, or embezzle-
ment-will trigger the WSLA.
2. The Meaning of "Running"
If the statute of limitations is a thicket of legal questions, 72 the
terminology associated with it only adds to the tangle. Ambiguity sur-
rounding the term "run" provides a prime example. To "run" con-
notes a termination but also a process of continuation-the process
has "run its course" versus the "river runs through it." The 1948 lan-
guage of the WSLA stated that "the running of any statute of limita-
tions ... shall be suspended until three years after the termination of
hostilities." 73 In the years following the WSLA's enactment, courts
and lawmakers struggled with whether they should interpret "run-
ning" to mean "concluding" or "continuing."
Facing this question in United States v. Klinger, Judge Learned
Hand noted that "the word, 'running,' is a colloquial term, not a
'word of art,' . . . and it does not appear to us that in this setting it so
inexorably excludes the meaning, 'bar,' that it will not bear that con-
struction, if only so will the purpose of the Act as a whole be realized,
and consequences avoided that Congress certainly would not have tol-
erated. ' 74 Put another way, Judge Hand interpreted the statute to
mean that the "closing" or "ending" of the statute of limitations would
not occur until three years after the war. To provide a three-year toll-
ing period plus the three-year limitations period for fraud would, as
Judge Hand explained, "more than double[ ] the existing period of
limitation . . a situation . . . that Congress would [not] have
countenanced. "'75
70 See id. at 222.
71 See id. at 223.
72 See Callahan, supra note 4.
73 An Act to Revise, Codify, and Enact Into Positive Law, Title 18 of the United States
Code, Entitled "Crimes and Criminal Procedure," ch. 645, § 3287, 62 Stat. 683, 828 (1948)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2006)).
74 199 F.2d 645, 646 (1952), affdpercuriam, 345 U.S. 979 (1953). Judge Hand's analy-
sis directly contradicted the accepted interpretation of the term "running" and what he
admitted to be the literal meaning of the statutory language. Id. Judge Hand did not favor
literal readings, however, as demonstrated in his famous explanation of statutory interpre-
tation: "There is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally .... As
nearly as we can, we must put ourselves in the place of those who uttered the words, and try
to divine how they would have dealt with the unforeseen situation; and, although their
words are by far the most decisive evidence of what they would have done, they are by no
means final." Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944) (Hand, J., concurring).
75 Klinger, 199 F.2d at 646.
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Quite to the contrary, writing for a five-justice majority in United
States v. Grainger, Justice Burton overruled Judge Hand's reading of
the statute the following year. "There is no doubt as to the meaning
of the word 'running,"' he explained. 76 The statute of limitations
clock resumes ticking "only three [(now five)] years after the date of
the termination of hostilities as proclaimed by the President or Con-
gress."' 77 A strong dissent countered that the Court should adopt
Judge Hand's interpretation of the statute in Klinger.78 Nevertheless,
the "termination of hostilities + 5 years" interpretation is the law
today.79
III
TRIGGERING AND DEACTIVATING § 3287
Having determined how the WSLA operates and to which crimes
it applies, we now turn to a more basic question: when will it switch on
and switch off? To use the provision, a prosecutor must show that
"the United States is at war or Congress has enacted a specific authori-
zation for the use of the Armed Forces."80 Although courts have re-
solved how the WSLA affects crimes committed shortly before or after
a time of war, what precisely constitutes war remains unclear.
A. Treatment of Fraud Within Close Temporal Proximity to a
Time of War
The statute's bare language fails to specify the treatment of fraud
committed shortly before or after a time of war. For crimes commit-
ted before the war but for which the limitations window is still open
76 United States v. Grainger, 346 U.S. 235, 245 (1953).
77 Id. at 246.
78 Id. at 248.
79 In light of the tenuous majority in Grainger-as well as changes to the statute and to
the composition of the Court that would interpret it-some uncertainty may surround the
"termination of hostilities + 5 years" interpretation. Moreover, a starkly different context
framed the statute in 1953, when the Court decided Grainger. The Korean War weighed on
government resources while prosecutors were still addressing crimes from World War II;
the Vinson Court may have wished to read extra lenience into the statute to aid prosecu-
tors overwhelmed by back-to-back wars with back-to-back procurement problems. A con-
temporary Court, facing an already long tolling period, may be less inclined to interpret
the statute in a manner that gives prosecutors a five-year cushion after the war in addition
to the time remaining on the underlying limitations clock. In addition, Senator Leahy
implied a reading of the statute that stands closer to Judge Hand's interpretation. Shortly
after introducing the 2008 Amendment, he explained that "this bill would just toll the
running of the statute during the conflict itself and not a day longer." 154 CONG. REC.
S3175 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2008). Regardless of these factors, given the identical statutory
phrasing at issue in Grainger and at issue today, the Court would not likely change its gloss
on the WSLA. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (discussing the importance of precedent in reexamining prior
holdings).
80 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (Supp. IV 2010).
[Vol. 97:15571570
LIM!TLESS LIMITATIONS
when the war begins, will the WSLA apply? That is, if Blackstone com-
mitted a crime on January 1, 2020, and a war began on July 1, 2022,
would the statute of limitations on this crime pause pursuant to
§ 3287, or does the WSLA affect only crimes committed during the
war? In Grainger, the Supreme Court chose the former course, ex-
plaining, "For those offenses which occurred before [the war com-
menced], Congress' intention was to give the Department three years
after the cessation of hostilities plus whatever portion of the regular
three-year limitations' period had not yet run . . . ."81 Consequently,
any criminal fraud against the government with time remaining on its
limitations clock falls under the WSLA's tolling provision.8
2
On the other end of the war, a similar question arises. After its
2008 Amendment, the WSLA provides a full five years after the war
before the limitations clock begins to tick again, 83 but will the WSLA
toll the statute of limitations for an act of fraud committed during the
post-war buffer period? For example, if a war ended on December 31,
2010, would a crime of fraud committed on June 1, 2012, fall within
the WSLA's scope? Prosecutors in the post-World War II era argued
that certain types of fraud covered by the statute-in particular, fraud
relating to surplus military property-would occur after hostilities
ceased. Accordingly, the WSLA should cover them.8 4 The Court dis-
agreed in United States v. Smith, holding that the WSLA "is inapplicable
to crimes committed after the date of termination of hostilities."
8 5
Justice William Douglas reasoned that Congress intended to alleviate
the fear that "law-enforcement officers would be so preoccupied with
prosecution of the war effort that the crimes of fraud perpetrated
against the United States would be forgotten until it was too late."
8 6
Only the "frenzied activities" of war justify extending the limitations
period; "when the pressure [is] off, the time [begins] to run again. 87
B. Activating the WSIA
Although courts have provided an answer as to how they will ap-
ply the WSLA to crimes committed shortly before or after a war, this
knowledge is not much without knowing what constitutes "war." Iden-
tifying a war may be a simple task in the case of an Article I declara-
81 Grainger, 346 U.S. at 247 (quoting United States v. Smith, 342 U.S. 225, 231 (1952)
(Clark, J., concurring)).
82 From our example, Blackstone would have two-and-a-half years remaining on his
statute of limitations clock after the WSLA ceased to operate.
83 See Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act,
2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, § 8117(3), 122 Stat. 3574, 3647 (2008) (amending 18 U.S.C.
§ 3287 "by striking 'three years' and inserting '5 years'").
84 See Brief for Petitioner at 27-28, Smith, 342 U.S. 225 (Nos. 20, 162).
85 See 342 U.S. at 228.
86 Id. at 229.
87 Id.
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tion, but it is less clear how the WSLA, in its original form, interacts
with congressional authorizations for the use of force, like those in-
volved in the Persian Gulf War or the more recent wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq. Although the 2008 Amendment has partly resolved this
question, the Amendment does not address thousands of crimes com-
mitted before 2008 to which the original WSLA language still applies.
For these crimes, courts must interpret both versions of the WSLA to
determine whether the statute of limitations has been tolled.88
1. Prior to the 2008 Amendment
From the end of the World War II era to the enactment of the
2008 Amendment, only two cases implicated the WSLA. These cases
stand in direct conflict.
In United States v. Shelton, prosecutors charged the defendant with
three counts of fraudulent activity occurring as late as May 7, 1987.89
The grand jury indictment issued on June 16, 1992-more than a
month after the five-year limitations window closed. Although the
prosecutor asserted that the congressionally authorized conflict in the
Persian Gulf in 1991 tolled the statute of limitations, the court was
skeptical.
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas doubted
whether the impact of the conflict in the Persian Gulf equaled World
War II's "extremely broad and intrusive effect into the entire country,"
for which Congress enacted the WSLA.90 Moreover, the prosecution's
argument suffered inasmuch as the government had not utilized the
WSLA during other post-World War II conflicts that were far more
intrusive into prosecutorial operations than the conflict in the Persian
Gulf. Ultimately, the Court concluded that, for the WSLA to take ef-
fect, "Congress should have formally recognized [the] conflict as a
war. The Judicial Branch of the United States has no constitutional
power to declare a war."91
More than a decade later, another prosecutor attempted to util-
ize the WSLA in reference to the Authorizations for the Use of Mili-
tary Force in Afghanistan (AUMFA) and Iraq (AUMFI).92 In United
88 Another difficult interpretive question could arise if Congress declared that a state
of war had existed, as it did on December 8, 1941. In such a case, would the WSLA apply
retroactively to the moment when the state of war first existed-i.e., the December 7 at-
tack-or would it only apply prospectively from the moment of congressional action? The
Supreme Court did not have to address this issue in the World War II era because it held
that the tolling mechanism applied beginning with the enactment of the WSLA in 1942.
See id. at 226, 231. Neither have the modem cases addressed this potentiality.
89 816 F. Supp. 1132, 1134 (W.D. Tex. 1993).
90 Id. at 1134-35.
91 Id. at 1135.
92 Congress enacted the AUMFA on September 18, 2001. Authorization for Use of
Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541
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States v. Prosperi, the prosecutor charged the defendants with both
fraud on a government contract and mail fraud.93 The indictment
issued on May 3, 2006-more than five years after the most recent
offense-placing the alleged crimes outside the five-year statute of
limitations unless the WSLA paused the limitations clock.94 The U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts criticized the Shelton
court's rigid reading of § 3287, questioning why a small declared war
such as the Mexican-American War would toll limitations but a large
undeclared war like the Korean conflict would not.95 The Court rea-
soned that if "Congress intended the phrase 'at war' to serve as a limi-
tation, it would have written the modifier 'declared' into the Act as it
has in other statutes. '96
As an alternative, the Prosperi court derived from ancient com-
mon law the concept of an "imperfect war," which, although un-
declared, nevertheless consists of "indicia of war" sufficient to classify
a conflict as a war. 97 Prosperi suggests four criteria: "(1) the extent of
the [congressional] authorization . . . ; (2) whether the conflict
[would be] deemed a 'war' under accepted definitions of the term
and the rules of international law; (3) the size and scope of the con-
flict (including the cost of the related procurement effort); and (4)
the diversion of resources that might have been expended on investi-
gating frauds against the government." 98 In applying these criteria to
the situation at hand, the Court pointed to the congressional authori-
zations of force to satisfy the first point. To meet the second criterion,
the Court asserted that the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan would be
characterized as wars by most common definitions of "war." Finally,
the Court argued that the number of servicemembers stationed over-
seas, the vast sums of money expended, and the dramatic overhaul of
civilian law enforcement efforts after September 11, 2001, all worked
in unison to satisfy the third and fourth requirements of the test.99
Rejecting the Shelton court's conclusions, the Prosperi court concluded
that a state of war had existed such that the WSLA applied and the
indictment would stand. 100
(2006)). The AUMFI followed on October 16, 2002. Authorization for Use of Military
Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002) (codified
at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)).
93 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 438-39 (D. Mass. 2008).
94 Id. at 439.
95 See id. at 445-46.
96 Id. at 446.
97 See id. (citing Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40-41 (1800)).
98 Id. at 449.
99 See id. at 450-54.
100 Id. at 455-56.
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2. After the 2008 Amendment
The 2008 Amendment arose, at least in part, to resolve the main
question that Shelton and Prosperi left open: What is war? Like the Pros-
per court, members of Congress sought to apply the WSLA to the con-
flicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.' 0 t As a result, after 2008, two different
types of war trigger the WSLA.
The first is the traditional declaration of war by Congress, as con-
ceived in Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. 10 2 The second
involves a specific authorization for the use of armed force as de-
scribed in 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2006), better known as the War Pow-
ers Resolution. The War Powers Resolution provides three ways by
which the President may introduce the U.S. military into hostile ac-
tion: a formal declaration of war, a national emergency arising from
an attack on the United States, or specific statutory authorization
passed by both Houses of Congress.10 3 By reference to the War Pow-
ers Resolution, the WSLA implicates this third method only.10 4 As a
result, the congressional authorizations for the use of force in Afghan-
istan and in Iraq fall squarely within the amended WSLA.
3. Retroactivity Problems
The 2008 Amendment clarified what will trigger the WSLA, but
its retroactive reach is limited by the Constitution, meaning that it
cannot provide answers to events that took place before its enactment.
In Stogner v. California, the Supreme Court held that the U.S. Constitu-
tion's Ex Post Facto Clause does not permit limitations amendments
to operate retroactively once the limitations period in question has
closed.10 5 Consequently, the pre-2008 reading of the WSLA still af-
101 See 154 CONG. REc. S9964-65 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
("This bill simply amends current law to make clear that extending the statute of limita-
tions during wartime applies to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan."); 154 CONG. REc. S8830
(daily ed. Sept. 10, 2008) (statement of Sen. Levin) ("[T]he United States is now engaged
in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan without a formal declaration of war. The
amendment takes the appropriate step of modifying the statute of limitations to cases in
which the use of force has been authorized without a formal declaration of war."); 154
CONG. REc. 83174-75 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2008) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (expressing simi-
lar sentiments).
102 Congress has declared war only five times in U.S. history: the War of 1812, the
Mexican-American War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and World War II. See
RICHARD F. GR1MMETr, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41677, INSTANCES OF USE OF UNITED STATES
ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798-2010, at 2-31 (2011) (listing all notable military engagements
from 1798 to 2010).
103 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (2006).
104 To view this reference in the statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (Supp. IV 2010), which
concludes by stating that "the term 'war' includes a specific authorization for the use of the
Armed Forces, as described in section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C.
1544(b))."
105 See 539 U.S. 607, 609-10 (2003).
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fects the limitations period for any crime committed more than five
years before the enactment date of the 2008 Amendment. For exam-
ple, the statute of limitations for a crime committed in November of
2001 would have expired in November 2006 based on Shelton, and the
Ex Post Facto Clause would prohibit the 2008 Amendment from resur-
recting that stale crime. On the other hand, the statute of limitations
for the same crime under Prosperi would have been tolled by the
AUMFA and the AUMFI. As a result, the limitations clock would not
have expired before the 2008 Amendment went into effect, meaning
that the Amendment would apply and the statute of limitations would
remain tolled today for that 2001 crime. In this way, any WSLA-eligi-
ble crime committed between September 1996 and September 2003-
likely more than 15,000 crimesl 06-will require a court to decide be-
tween Prosperi and Shelton or to announce a different standard for de-
termining how the WSLA applied to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
before 2008.
Two 2010 cases demonstrate how the pre-2008 WSLA remains rel-
evant. In the July 2010 decision in United States v. Western Titanium,
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California con-
fronted a December 2008 indictment that contained four charges of
fraud committed against the government in 2002.107 After carefully
considering the Prosperi decision, the Court rejected it, stating,
"[w] hatever Congress intended by the phrase 'at war' in the WSLA, it
cannot have meant a definition not capable of determination until a
court conducts a subjective analysis years after the commission of an
offense."108 The Court further explained that determining a limita-
tions question using a loose post hoc test would be "completely at
odds with the objectives of finality, notice, and prompt investigation
sought to be served by a criminal statute of limitations." 10 9 Conse-
quently, the Court determined that the statute of limitations for those
alleged crimes closed in 2007, a year before the 2008 Amendment
expanded the WSIA's scope. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the
case.
106 See BARNETr, supra note 3, at 5 (identifying roughly 7,000 crimes likely eligible for
WSLA treatment in a three-year period).
107 No. 08-CR-4229-JLS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65786, at *2-4 (S.D. Cal. July 1, 2010).
The indictment in this case issued after the 2008 Amendment. More recently, the Court in
United States v. Anghaie, No. 1:09-CR-37-SPM/AK, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23863, at *5-7
(N.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2011), followed the reasoning of Western Titanium. See also United States
ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co., No. 1:11cv602 (JCC/JFA), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145236,
at *27-29 (E.D. Va. Dec. 12, 2011) (acknowledging the ongoing dispute as to whether the
pre-Amendment WSLA applied to the AUMFA and AUMFI but declining to decide the
issue).
108 W. Titanium, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65786, at *9.
109 Id. at *10.
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In August 2010, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Mississippi held in the alternative, determining that Prosperi applies.
The defendant in United States v. Pearson faced two charges of fraud
against the government for acts committed no later than 2002.110
Rather than building its own analysis, the Court borrowed the four-
part test established in Prosperi and adopted that court's conclusion.111
Western Titanium and Pearson illustrate the split over the definition of
"at war" that persists even after the 2008 Amendment and that will
persist until appellate courts begin to nail down just how the pre-2008
WSLA applies to the AUMFA and AUMFI.
C. Deactivating the WSLA: "... . until five years after the
termination of hostilities . . ."
Even if we manage to determine what constitutes "at war" under
the WSLA, the question of when that war ends for purposes of the
statute remains unclear. And as with the activation of the WSLA, so
too the date of the charged crime may affect the WSLA's deactivation.
1. Pre-2008 Language
Under the WSLA's pre-2008 language, the statute of limitations
stayed frozen until three years after the termination of hostilities as
proclaimed by the President or resolved by both chambers of Con-
gress. The old language left some ambiguity regarding what steps
constitute a sufficient termination of hostilities and what form a presi-
dential proclamation must take. Consider, for example, the end of
World War II. When did the war end? Was it the German uncondi-
tional surrender on May 8, 1945 that ended the war? The uncondi-
tional surrender by the Japanese on September 2, 1945? President
Truman's proclamation in December 1946 of a "termination of hostil-
ities" accompanied by a statement that "a state of war still exists"? The
1947joint resolution of Congress that terminated most of the Articles
of War? Congress's 1951 resolution terminating the war with Ger-
many? Or President Truman's 1952 proclamation terminating the
war with Japan? In total, six events, spanning seven years, might qual-
ify as the end of the war. 112
Before 2008, the WSLA stated that the limitations clock would
start ticking again three years after the "termination of hostilities." Al-
though World War II's fighting ceased in September 1945 and affir-
mations in 1947, 1951, and 1952 might be deemed in a general sense
to have ended hostilities, the Supreme Court determined that the
President's 1946 proclamation terminated hostilities for the purpose
110 No. 2:09cr43-KS-MTP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79242, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Aug 4, 2010).
111 See id. at *4.
112 See Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 230 (1959).
1576 [Vol. 97:1557
LIMITLESS LIMITATIONS
of the WSLA, even though that proclamation recognized an ongoing
state of war.113
A half-century later, when the Prosperi court tried to determine
when the hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan had terminated, it could
not point to any statement as clear as President Truman's "termina-
tion of hostilities." Instead, the Court asserted that modem warfare
did not conclude with peace treaties or formal proclamations but with
"diplomatic . . . recognition" and informal "pronouncement [s].1"114
Thus, the Court determined that, for the AUMFA, the WSLA termi-
nated when the Karzai Government took control of Afghanistan in
December 2001, and for the AUMFI, the WSLA terminated when
President Bush proclaimed "Mission Accomplished" from the deck of
the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln on May 1, 2003.115 Consequently, under
the Prosperi analysis, although the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan
tolled the limitations period, the limitations clock started ticking
again on May 2, 2006.
On the facts, this conclusion is absurd. More problematic, it runs
against precedent. The Supreme Court noted in 2004 that the hostili-
ties in Afghanistan had not ended. Central to its holding in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, the Court observed, "[a] ctive combat operations against
Taliban fighters apparently are ongoing in Afghanistan."'1 16 As a re-
sult, even if courts follow Prosperi's four-point test for determining
whether a war has started, they cannot well follow its method for de-
termining whether hostilities have ended.
2. Post-2008 Language
The 2008 Amendment goes halfway toward answering end-date
questions. Obviously, Congress passed the Amendment in part be-
cause it determined that the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq were
"ongoing."11 7 For any crimes subject to the Amendment, then, the
tolling period has not ended. The bill's sponsor also emphasized that
the bill would require either a congressional resolution or a formal
proclamation by the President, with notice to Congress, in order to
terminate hostilities. 118 Nevertheless, even this new requirement may
not provide a satisfying end-date for the purpose of deactivating the
WSLA. The statute requires the courts to look to Congress or the
President for a resolution or proclamation; the courts may not con-
113 See United States v. Smith, 342 U.S. 225, 227 (1952).
114 United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 454 (D. Mass. 2008).
115 See id. at 455.
116 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004).
117 154 CONG. REc. S3174-75 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2008) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
118 See id. at S3175.
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sider the reality of the military situation.1 1 9 Thus, the political
branches control the WSLA's off-switch. In this way, shifting political
considerations-rather than prosecutorial necessity-will likely affect
its operation. This political skew is the practical consequence of Sena-
tor Leahy's focus on exploiting President Bush's vulnerabilities rather
than on producing clear, constructive policy. 120
IV
A CONSISTENT INTERPRETATION OF § 3287
In view of these unresolved issues of application, courts need to
answer three questions. First, for acts of fraud committed between
September 18, 1996, and September 27, 2003,121 does Prosper's or
Shelton's trigger analysis apply, or does some other standard apply in-
stead? Second, if Prosperi applies, does its end-date standard apply, or
do Hamdi and military realities foreclose that reading for cases that
fall in the gap prior to the 2008 Amendment? Finally, if a crime falls
under the 2008 Amendment-either because its limitation had not
closed by September 27, 2008, or it was committed after that date-
what kind of presidential proclamation will end the war?122 The fol-
lowing three figures illustrate how a court's method of answering
these questions can materially impact the length of time that a would-
be defendant remains subject to criminal liability.
119 See Sarah E. Barnes, Comment, Categorizing Conflict in the Wartime Enforcement of
Frauds Act: When Are We Really at War?, 59 DEPAUL L. Riv. 979, 1009 (2010) ("[T]here is no
way to guarantee that even formal proclamations would be free of political motivation or
would better reflect when hostilities end.... [After President Truman terminated hostili-
ties], questions arose as to whether the date of the proclamation was appropriate for the
purposes of the Suspension Act. In United States v. Smith, the concurrence took issue with
the fact that the proclamation was made on December 31, 1946, even though 'all war
procurement stopped [and] contracts were canceled' 'immediately after V-J
day' . . . sixteen months earlier." (footnote omitted)).
120 See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
121 The 1996 date is five years before the AUMFA, which is the earliest date that could
trigger the WSLA. The 2003 date is five years before Congress passed the Amendment to
the WSLA, after which any relevant crime will automatically fall solely under the Amend-
ment's provisions.
122 The ambiguity seems limited only to a situation in which the President announces
the end of hostilities because, presumably, courts will have no difficulty determining the
end of hostilities if Congress revokes the AUMFA or declares by joint resolution an end to
hostilities.
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FIGURE 1: A 1997 CRIME, USING SHELTON TO DETERMINE WHETHER
THE WSLA APPLIES.
FIGURE 2: A 1997 CRIME, USING PROSPERI TO DETERMINE BOTH
WHETHER THE WSLA APPLIES AND WHEN HOSTILITIES END.
1997 2001 2003 2006 2007
Defendant The AUMFA takes The AUMFI takes The three-year The statute of
commits an act of effect and triggers effect and buffer period ends; limitations expires
fraud. WSLA; hostilities retriggers WSLA; the statute of for this crime.
ceased later that hostilities cease limitations clock
year. later that year, begins to tick
which starts the again.
three-year buffer
period.
FIGURE 3. A 1997 CRIME, USING PROSPERI TO DETERMINE WHETHER
THE WSLA APPLIES AND HAMDI TO DETERMINE
WHEN HOSTILITIES END.
1997 2001 2003 2010-2011 2014 2019 2020
Defendant The AUMFA The AUMFI Hostilities in Hostilities in The five-year The statute of
commits an act takes effect takes effect Iraq terminate Afghanistan buffer period limitations
of fraud, and triggers and retriggers and combat terminate and ends; the expires.
WSLA. WSLA. troops depart. combat troops statute of
depart; the limitations
five-year buffer clock begins to
begins, tick again.
A. Prosperi versus Shelton
To determine whether Prosperi or Shelton applies, criminal courts
should look to canons of construction. The Supreme Court has held
that courts should construe statutes of limitations liberally in favor of
defendants: "[W] hen choice has to be made between two readings of
what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we
choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have
spoken in language that is clear and definite. We should not derive
criminal outlawry from some ambiguous implication."1 23 If one plau-
sible interpretation favors a defendant and another goes against the
defendant's interest, courts should take the former approach. As a
corollary, therefore, courts should construe tolling mechanisms nar-
123 United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952).
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rowly.1 24 Using this standard to decide between Prosperi and Shelton,
the Shelton holding should win out.
The purposes behind statutes of limitations shed additional light
on which reading should prevail. As discussed above in Part I.A, sta-
bility and certainty are central rationales for limitations, and, as
demonstrated in Figure 3 above, a broad reading of the WSLA could
place potential defendants in a state of perpetual limbo for decades.
Moreover, assuming that statutes of limitations exist to ensure the use
of fresh evidence, the Prosperi court's reading of the WSLA could com-
promise this aim by bringing a citizen into court to defend a 1996
crime in 2019 or later, depending on the end of the war in Afghani-
stan. 125 Likewise, if statutes of limitations should serve to focus prose-
cutors, then an interpretation of the WSLA that would give
prosecutors two decades to prosecute fraud has no justification. And,
although the law has developed such that the need for justice in the
face of grave crimes will often override the purpose for which limita-
tions exist, pecuniary fraud against the government hardly falls into
the same category as capital offenses or heinous acts of terrorism or
kidnapping.126 In sum, applying Prosperi would ignore the rationales
that, over centuries of legal development, gave rise to statutes of
limitations.
Taking too broad an interpretation of the WSLA also poses con-
stitutional problems. Based on the scenario in Figure 3, the Prosperi
analysis could result in a criminal defendant facing charges for a rela-
tively minor crime more than twenty years after its commission. This
long delay could violate the Fifth Amendment right to due process. 127
Although statutes of limitations serve typically as "the primary guaran-
tee against bringing overly stale criminal charges,"1 28 they do not
"fully define the [defendants'] rights with respect to the events occur-
ring prior to indictment."'129 The Due Process Clause also serves to
protect defendants against oppressive delay that would cause them ac-
124 See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 n.14 (1971); Bridges v. United States,
346 U.S. 209, 215-16 (1953).
125 One might argue that, although theoretically possible, prosecutors would not likely
wish to bring charges in relation to such an ancient crime. To the contrary, the frequent
use of the WSLA throughout the 1950s-right up until the WSLA's tolling mechanism
ceased to apply-suggests that prosecutors are not shy about using the tools at their dispo-
sal to secure a conviction, regardless of the crime's age.
126 See DOYLE, supra note 1, at 19-22 (listing these three categories and certain sexual
offenses as the only crimes for which federal law provides no limitation on prosecution).
127 See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977); Marion, 404 U.S. at 322, 324.
The Court held in Marion and affirmed in Lovasco, however, that the Speedy Trial Clause
does not apply to pre-indictment delays. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 788-89; Marion, 404 U.S. at
320.
128 Marion, 404 U.S. at 322 (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966)).
129 Id. at 324.
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tual prejudice, and an effectively limitless limitation under the WSLA
could run afoul of that provision.1 30
Finally, several practical factors weigh against the Prosperi deci-
sion. First, the principle of desuetude holds that a long-disused legal
provision will lose legal effect. 131 The WSLA sat on prosecutors'
shelves through the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and several
smaller authorizations of force before the government dusted it off
during the Persian Gulf War in Shelton.132 As a matter of fairness, that
the government failed to utilize the WSLA during non-declared wars
should serve to define the scope of the statute's use. Moreover, the
Eightieth Congress, which passed the WSLA in 1948, gave no indica-
tion that it intended the law to apply to the kind of military activity the
United States has conducted in the 1990s and 2000s.' 33 The Persian
Gulf War and the military activity in Afghanistan and Iraq did not re-
present the same kind of total war for which the statute was originally
enacted, 134 nor did they represent the kind of "frenzied activities" to
which the Supreme Court limited the WSLA's reach. 135 The wars did
not affect the U.S. civilian population in the same way that World War
II did by requiring meaningful contribution from every citizen. 136 For
crimes that implicate the pre-2008 statute, it would be inequitable to
permit the government to apply the WSLA to the AUMFA and
AUMFI, which are qualitatively indistinguishable from the wars in Ko-
rea, Vietnam and Kuwait-wars in which the WSLA was not applied.
Moreover, by applying the WSLA to a conflict that bears no practical
resemblance to the war for which it was originally enacted, courts
would stretch the tolling mechanism beyond its limits.
The Shelton decision comports with the purposes of the WSLA
and with the path of statutes-of-limitations jurisprudence. Courts
should follow that decision rather than Prosperi when determining the
WSLA's applicability to crimes committed before September 2003.
130 See Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 789.
131 BLACK'S LAW DIc-rIONARx 513 (9th ed. 2009) ("The doctrine holding that if a statute
or treaty is left unenforced long enough, the courts will no longer regard it as having any
legal effect even though it has not been repealed.").
132 816 F. Supp. 1132, 1134 (W.D. Tex. 1993).
133 In United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 444-45 (D. Mass. 2008), the Court
confronted whether or not to follow this line of argument and concluded that, notwith-
standing the doctrine's implied use in Shelton, 816 F. Supp. at 1135, it should not apply to
the WSLA.
134 See Penetrable Barrier, supra note 10, at 648.
135 See United States v. Smith, 342 U.S. 225, 229 (1952).
136 See Rick Hampson, Effects of Iraq War Vary Dramatically in USA, USA ToDAY, Mar. 16,
2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-03-16-iraq-war-anniversary-effects
_x.htm.
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B. Hamdi Versus Prosperi
Nevertheless, if courts do determine that the AUMFA and AUMFI
triggered WSLA before the 2008 Amendment, Prosperi's standard for
the conflicts' end-dates should not apply. In Hamdi, the Supreme
Court's finding that the conflicts were ongoing was central to the
holding of the case, 137 directly undermining the reasoning in Prosperi.
Prosperi should yield to binding case law and to military realities.
Other factors weigh against the Prosperi end-date analysis. First,
the AUMFA authorized the use of force not against Afghanistan but
against "nations, organizations, or persons" that contributed to the at-
tacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.138 This broad lan-
guage-clearly intended by Congress to entail more than the Afghan
state-did not lose effect when the Karzai Government took charge,
and it contains no sunset provision so long as the President requires
ongoing authority to use force in order to prevent subsequent terror-
ist attacks.
Second, after the end-dates that Prosperi suggests, the conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan did not wind down; they escalated. Through
fiscal year (FY) 2002, the United States spent $20.8 billion on military
operations in Afghanistan. Then from FY 2003 to FY 2010, the United
States spent nearly $300 billion pursuant to the AUMFA. Likewise,
through FY 2003, the United States spent $53 billion for the fight in
Iraq. Then from FY 2004 to FY 2010, that number jumped to nearly
$700 billion.1 39 And, although more than 200 troops lost their lives in
Iraq and Afghanistan between September 2001 and the end of April
2003,140 far more servicemembers lost their lives in each year after
2003-indeed, in each year from 2004 to 2007, nearly 1,000 soldiers,
seamen, airmen, and marines gave their best and final effort for their
country. 14 1 Hostilities did not cease in 2001 or 2003; they continued
at great cost. The Prosperi analysis ignores this reality.
C. When Will Hostilities End?
Crimes committed after September 2003 do not suffer from the
interpretive wrangling between Prosperi, Shelton, and Hamdi because
these crimes fall under the 2008 Amendment. But, under the Amend-
ment, when will hostilities end? President Barack Obama declared an
137 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004).
138 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)).
139 See AMY BELASCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33110, THE COST OF IRAQ, AFGHANI-
STAN, AND OTHER GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR OPERATIONS SINCE 9/11, at 3 (2010).
140 See Faces of the Fallen, WASH. POST, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/fallen/
dates/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2012).
141 See id.
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end to combat operations in Iraq on August 31, 2010.142 More than a
year later, on December 18, 2011, the last combat troops departed
Iraq.1 43 It is unclear which, if either, of these equates to President
Harry S. Truman's declaration of the end of hostilities in 1946.144 Be-
cause the war in Afghanistan continues, however, the end-date of the
Iraq war is less salient to the WSLA.
So what about Afghanistan? The White House has indicated that
the combat mission will continue until 2014.145 The WSLA provides
two methods for ending hostilities: presidential proclamation and
congressional resolution. 146 Unless Congress intervenes to revoke the
AUMFA, 147 nothing short of a presidential proclamation would consti-
tute a termination of hostilities. 148 By this standard, the presumptive
end date lies in 2013 or beyond. 1
49
142 See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on
the End of Combat Operations in Iraq (Aug. 31, 2010), available at http://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/31/remarks-president-address-nation-end-combat-op-
erations-iraq.
143 See Joseph Logan, Last U.S. Troops Leave Iraq, Ending War, REUTERS, Dec. 18, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011 / 12/18/us-iraq-withdrawal-idUSTRE7BH033201112
18.
144 See discussion supra Part III.C.1. In his 2011 State of the Union Address, President
Obama demonstrated how tricky nailing down the end-date of a war can be, stating, "The
Iraq war is coming to an end." Remarks by the President in State of Union Address (Jan. 25,
2011) (emphasis added), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/
01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address. The President had previously declared the
end of America's combat mission on August 31, 2010, but had hostilities then terminated?
Either way, the President implied that the war was not over.
145 See Peter Baker & Rod Nordland, U.S. Plan Offers Path to Ending Afghan Combat, N.Y.
TiMES, Nov. 15, 2010, at Al.
146 See 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (Supp. IV 2010).
147 Notably, less than a month before the last combat troops left Iraq, the U.S. Senate
declined to support a resolution that would have rescinded the Authorization for the Use
of Military Force in Iraq. See 157 CONG. REc. S7957 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 2011) (vote on the
Paul Amendment).
148 This proclamation would likely need to be accompanied by the complete with-
drawal of combat troops. By inference, the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541
(2006), and the WSLA's post-2008 language support this conclusion. The WSLA may be
deactivated in two ways: joint congressional action or a formal presidential proclamation
with notice to Congress. 18 U.S.C. § 3287. Under the War Powers Resolution, ajoint con-
gressional action would require the prompt removal of U.S. troops from combat opera-
tions. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (2006). The WSLA's structure implies that a presidential
proclamation represents an equivalent action. If that equivalent action should have an
equivalent effect, then it would remove troops from combat.
149 See Robert Burns, Afghanistan War: U.S. Troops to End Combat Role Next Year, HuF-
FINGTON Pos-r, Feb. 1, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/01/afghanistan-
war-panetta n-1247910.html ("Defense Secretary Leon Panetta [said] . . . that U.S. and
other international forces in Afghanistan expect to end their combat role in 2013 and
continue a training and advisory role with Afghan forces through 2014."). This protracted
war-and the concomitantly protracted tolling period-provides more reason for courts to
reject the Prosperi limitations analysis in order to remove as many pre-2008 crimes as possi-
ble from the WSLA's scope. Also worth consideration, Vidal's discussion of perpetual war
hints that new congressional authorizations for the use of force might not be far off in
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CONCLUSION
Statutes of limitations exist to provide stability to society and to
the justice system; as a measure of grace, they afford security to would-
be defendants who have long stayed within the law after their crimes.
Limitations also induce prosecutors to promptly investigate and indict
as soon as feasible, thus helping enforce the Fifth Amendment's man-
date for due process. Of course, limitations also require that some
wrongdoers go free, and in recognition of this, legislatures have struc-
tured statutes that attempt to balance society's need for justice against
its desire for fairness, efficiency, and grace. The Wartime Suspension
of Limitations Act represents one of Congress's attempts to fine-tune
the balance between these competing interests by ensuring that the
haste of wartime does not overcome justice.
Congress's fine-tuning, if not carefully applied, threatens to up-
turn this balance by effectively eliminating the limitations period for
crimes of fraud against the government. Given its broadest reading,
the WSLA could toll the statute of limitations for crimes committed in
the mid-1990s until 2020, which would represent a near five-fold in-
crease over the typical five-year limitations period for acts of fraud.
Under federal law, no limitations period extends this long unless Con-
gress specifically deems that the gravity of the underlying crime com-
pels no limitations period at all.
In the United States, crimes without limitations are a rare excep-
tion rather than the rule. From the First Congress, American law has
included a strict statute of limitations. Slowly, Congress has eased the
pressure that limitations place on federal prosecutors. By extending
the general limitations period from two years to five and by adding
new statutory tolling mechanisms, Congress has carefully readjusted
the scales that balance justice, fairness, and efficiency. Despite these
extensions, Congress has never turned its back on the fundamental
role that limitations play.
The WSLA and its 2008 Amendment represent adjustments to
the balance, but courts should not permit a broad reading of these
readjustments to upend the scales. When the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan conclude and government prosecutors begin to invoke
the broadest possible reading of the statute-just as they did after
World War II-courts should heed the American tradition of limited
periods of criminal liability. The multiple purposes of the statute of
limitations should guide courts as they seek an interpretation that
Iran, Mexico, or some other security hot spot around the world. See VIDAL, supra note 53,
at 20-21. If Congress authorized force prior to 2019, the WSLA would activate again, pick-
ing up any limitations periods that had tolled under the AUMFA and AUMFI. This, too,
would suggest that courts should exclude as many pre-2008 crimes as possible from the
WSLA's scope.
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strikes the balance that Congress envisioned. This interpretation
should defer to the longstanding principle that criminal limitations
are to be construed in favor of defendants and that tolling should be
applied as narrowly as possible.
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